Locky or Trickbot - Campaign and Infrastructure Analysis




The malicious email contained the base64 encrypted 7z compressed file in the email body! and did not arrive as an attachment. I am unable to comprehend why would the attacker send encoded malicious attachment in email body.



The mail with subject "Supplement payment <somenumber>" was received from an ip assigned to an Indonesian dyndns service provider:




The email domain of the sender was "rec.ca". IBM X-Force Exchange shows the malicious attachments which were sent from this domain



We can see that these are 7z files.


This is the webpage for reg.ca


I copied the base64 encoded hex to a file called "infected_attach" and then decoded it and piped the output to infectedzip.7z file.


we can see that it is indeed a 7-zip archive file:

I moved the decoded 7z file to my lab and found a vbs inside it



Windows Defender identifies the vbs as VBS/Schopets



 Hash of the vbs 57030ddd567e2bc26e75ef8ac2359079



Strangely VT had 0 detection for this vbs



 I proceeded to debug the script using Visual Studio:



Pirates :)


User Agent which is used by this malicious vba to communicate with:
1. Download sites hosting the malware
2. C2 communication


We can see the name of the exe, which will be written on disk


 We can see Microsoft.XMLHTTP object being created

and Adodb.Stream as well.

Also There is usage of Ref() function, which does not make sense here as the script is not running in the context of a webpage




Here it is checking if the current script is running in the context of "Windows Script Host":


Getting the Process Env Variables



Getting the Temp env variable value



Some of the developer’s statements are commented hinting on what he might be upto when writing this.


The interesting part is here where the script detects the country where the victim is located. It is using free APIs by freegeoip, geplugin and ipinfo for this purpose.

We can also see an array of country codes (GB=United Kingdom, UK=Ukraine, AU=Australia, LU=Luxembourg, BE=Belgium and IE=Ireland)



We can see result of all of the three services:




We can see the User string value:



Once the script gets the response from geolocation API, it parses it and look for the country code:





Next the script checks whether the country code given by the response equals the above mentioned country codes, if yes then the first set of URLs will be used to download the malware, In case the country is different than the above 6 countries then a different set of URLs will be used to download a different malware:


In any case the malware was no long available as we could see 404 response. However, I was able to get the samples from somewhere else.



The script also uses WMI query to get information of countrycode, version of OS and OStype:



we can see the concatenated string comprising of the information collected:


This information is POSTed to the C2 server


The complete request can be seen below:


Lots of Unused code

Now, the interesting part is a lot of unused code, which seemed to be code snippets borrowed from some other places or intentionally written (dont think so), to jumble up the code and make it confusing or to make it look like a genuine piece of code:

Why is this interesting to me. Because the unused code if written or borrowed by the malware author, would indicate his/her interests, maybe a code collection could indicate projects he/she has worked on, and give some insight on the mindset of the threat actor:









Next, I started looking up the snippet of the above unused code on both conventional as well as dark web:




Using strings (unused code), I discovered earliest samples of the same campaign (similar string in vbs files) seen uploaded to hybrid analysis, Cuckoo, pastebin and others on Sep 4th, 8th, 26, 27, 28, 29 and early October:



Following domains were contacted by the above samples for downloading malware:

·        qxr33qxr(dot)com/nui76tg7?
·        Nsaflow(dot)info/p66/nui76tg7
·        yamanashi-jyujin(dot)jp/nui76tg7?
·        Miamirecyclecenters(dot)com/09yhb7r5e?
·        Nsaflow(dot)info/p66/09yhb7r5e
·        Atlantarecyclingcenters(dot)com/09yhb7r5e?
·        autoecolejeanluc(dot)com
·        associationlachaloupe(dot)com
·        poemsan(dot)info
·        foxcabinets(dot)com/tfhytdrf56u?
·        derainlay(dot)info/p66/tfhytdrf56u
·        mautau(dot)it/tfhytdrf56u?
·        mastertenniscoach(dot)com/iugftrs2?
·        Nsaflow(dot)info/p66/iugftrs2
·        Xploramail(dot)com/iugftrs2?
·        Gandmco(dot)com/9ghf45jhg?
·        Hutterstock(dot)org/p66/9ghf45jhg
·        www.pizzelli(dot)eu/9ghf45jhg?
·        Ernestoangiolini(dot)com/9ghf45jhg?
·        Hutterstock(dot)org/p66/9ghf45jhg
·        gandmco(dot)com/9ghf45jhg?
·        Anderlaw(dot)com/jhdsgvc74?
·        Ideathlike(dot)net/p66/jhdsgvc74
·        arc-conduite(dot)com/jhdsgvc74?
·        Formareal(dot)com/jkhguygv73?
·        Playbrief(dot)info/p66/jkhguygv73
·        fianceevisa101(dot)com/jkhguygv73?
·        Richarddrakeconstruction(dot)com/jhdgc62?
·        Sherylbro(dot)net/p66/jhdgc62
·        Centurythis(dot)com/jhdgc62?
·        Asecontrids(dot)com/d8743fgh?
·        Poemsan(dot)info/p66/d8743fgh
·        Consultingfranquean(dot)com/d8743fgh?
·        Fmarson(dot)com/jkhguygv73?
·        Playbrief(dot)info/p66/jkhguygv73
·        gaestehaus-im-vogelsang(dot)de/jkhguygv73?
·        hxxp://animatoon.be/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://autoecoleautonome.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://brownpa.net/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://calpadia.co.id/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://clubdeautores.es/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://cogerea.net/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://dueeffepromotion.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://hard-grooves.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://hellonwheelsthemovie.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://prescottinternet.net/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://qxr33qxr.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://suncoastot.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://uvitacr.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://www.pentahealthinstitute.com/JIKJHgft
·        hxxp://naturofind.org/p66/JIKJHgft
·        babyemozioni(dot)it/KJSkjdhf?
·        Tertrodefordown(dot)info/af/KJSkjdhf
·        baptistown-nj(dot)com/KJSkjdhf?

And the IOCs from the sample I was analysing:

Malware Download Domains
For GB UK AU LU BE IE

·        Highlandfamily(dot)org/jhbfvg7?
·        Fetchstats(dot)net/p66/jhbfvg7
·        bnphealthcare(dot)com/jhbfvg7?

For rest
·        team-bobcat(dot)org/8y6ghhfg?
·        Fetchstats(dot)net/p66/8y6ghhfg
·        highpressurewelding(dot)co.uk/8y6ghhfg?

C2 Domains
hxxp://unhanorarse(dot)info/tr554.php
hxxp://haddownding(dot)net/trtrtr.php
hxxp://rateventrithathen(dot)info/tr554.php


I proceeded to look up the unused string code further, out of curiosity and to see where would it take me.

Strings from Unused Code, Researched using OSINT


Keyword: "Someone botted your ass with a steel boot"
A phrase in the unused code “Someone booted your ass with a steel toe boot” in the vbs was also discovered in the following code in a github repo along with matching unused code in the vb script




The user is tycho and the project is called “openarc-vb”.


This is the website of the user tycho


I clicked on the link to projects on the right side


I was directed to the openarc project page in Sourceforge


OpenArc is a Visual basic based project and a clone of "Sierra Arc" project, which is a CTF game (http://openarc.sourceforge.net/index.php?page=about). Sierra Arc was developed in 1997 by John Vechey.

And it seemed that a large portion of code from the project file CobaltServ_modMain.bas was placed in the script. What does this mean? I think the malicious script author might have been working on the openarc project locally on his/her machine, or maybe he/she randomly browsed VB projects on github/sourceforge and copied random pieces of code (subs/functions) and pasted in the script? Maybe the threat actor has some link or interest in the project. Maybe the threat actor is into online games etc.

Keyword: GetShitList(

Next string “GetShitList(ByVal” was found along with matching code in this repo and in the file modCommands.bas:


Also a VB6 project and a chat bot (Official Site: http://www.stealthbot.net). 



The user is called stealthbot and he/she seem to be maintaining the code (last commit May 5th 2017). The user calls himself "Andy T" from Milwaukee, Wisconsin USA:


But I found something more looking for this same string.


User = Trotup



User Trotup was also into hacking


When I visited user Trotup’s main page. It had link to stealthbot forum page also referred by Andy T in his github repo (user stealthbot). Maybe it is the same person:





Keyword: IsCircleAnalytic

Found the exact code on this site:

https://www.bvbcode.com/code/z0mc6sij-2316994   (signed by Wosign, a chinese CA)

This seems to be a VB project written for "Silverlight online geometric drawing"



I also found this same code uploaded to https://www.ecsdn.com/d-4Kzt.html by user snipernice


This is the homepage of snipernice and it seems to be a Chinese person:




Keyword:LenB(BotVars.BotOwner
Found some reference to this code also in git repo of Stealthbot


Keyword: "Encryption.Decryptstring(tmp"
Found reference again in the openarc-vb project:

Keyword: “GetVolumeInformation(strDrive, Drive_Label”
Ref found:




Again found on
https://github.com/tycho/openarc-vb/blob/master/src/Cobalt/CobaltServ_modMain.bas


http://forum.html.it/forum/showthread/t-366079.html (xegallo)



Looking at what gets downloaded

Now let us look at what are the two different hashes, which gets downloaded



Comparing this with the code we have seen that if is either "GB", "UK", "AU", "LU", "BE", "IE" it would have downloaded and executed

MD5: dbc0aa7e70df7e27ae9169ae0962e2cf (TrickBot)


Compilation Timestamp
2016-07-03 15:46:13

Creation Time
2016-07-03 15:46:13
First Seen In The Wild
2010-11-20 23:29:33
First Submission
2017-10-11 13:09:22
Last Submission
2017-10-12 19:21:10
Last Analysis
2017-10-20 01:49:54

Otherwise for all other countries it would have downloaded and executed:

MD5: dda37961870ce079defbf185eeeef905  (Locky)

Compilation Timestamp
2016-03-30 00:00:03
Creation Time
2016-03-30 00:00:03
First Seen In The Wild
2017-10-11 11:57:56
First Submission
2017-10-11 12:05:19
Last Submission
2017-10-19 20:38:07
Last Analysis
2017-10-20 05:01:32



The pipes connected to indicates that it is a ransomware
 For locky I downloaded the ransomware note in html from hybrid analysis



This is the instructions site in dark web
g46mbrrzpfszonuk(dot)onion/5DYGW69IP3PQSSYC. And we can see the Bitcoin address:
Bitcoin address: 1LkbVYuLXwnJniQj8zHLT4vuqrNHfnMXb8



No payments made yet:


Let us have a look at the malicious domains

First I copied all download URIs and C2 domains, I discovered during my sample collection (see above), to a file “domains.txt”


Then I run the following replacement to get only domain names and I pipe output to another file “refined_domains.txt”

cat domains.txt | sed 's/•//g' | sed 's/hxxp:\/\///g' | sed 's/www\.//g' | sed 's/(dot)/\./g' | sed 's/\s//g' | sed 's/\/.*//g' > refined_domains.txt


Next Download Passivetotal python client for querying the OSCTI source PassiveTotal from RiskIQ
https://github.com/passivetotal/python_api


Follow documentation to install




Querying one of the malware download domains results in default output in JSON


Since I ran out of quota for the PassiveTotal, I decided to use another service http://whoiz.herokuapp.com/

Simple script to run through the refined_domains.txt file and get whois info
-----------------------------------------------------Code Begin-------------------------------------------
import fileinput
import os

refined_file = open("refined_domains.txt","r")

os.system("rm -f whois_output.txt")
for aline in refined_file.readlines():
        cmd="curl -s http://whoiz.herokuapp.com/lookup.json?url=" + aline.strip() + " | grep -i 'domain\|created_on\|updated_on\|organization\|email\|name\|telephone\|url\|city\|state\|country\|country_code\|phone\|fax\|status' | grep -i -v 'disclaimer\|domain_id\|AFILIAS\|Xferd\Dload' | sed 's/^/" + aline.strip()+ " /'  >> whois_output.txt"
        os.system(cmd)

refined_file.close()
-----------------------------------------------------Code End-------------------------------------------
The output file looks like this



Domains clustered with same name servers

arc-conduite.com       "name": "a.dns.gandi.net",
associationlachaloupe.com       "name": "a.dns.gandi.net",
autoecoleautonome.com       "name": "a.dns.gandi.net",
autoecolejeanluc.com       "name": "a.dns.gandi.net",

Anderlaw.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",
Atlantarecyclingcenters.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",
Centurythis.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",
foxcabinets.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",
gandmco.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",
Gandmco.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",
Miamirecyclecenters.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",
suncoastot.com       "name": "dns1.name-services.com",

hard-grooves.com       "name": "dns1.siteturn.com",
hellonwheelsthemovie.com       "name": "dns1.siteturn.com",

Fmarson.com       "name": "dns2.host-redirect.com",
Anderlaw.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
Atlantarecyclingcenters.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
Centurythis.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
foxcabinets.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
gandmco.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
Gandmco.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
Miamirecyclecenters.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
suncoastot.com       "name": "dns2.name-services.com",
hard-grooves.com       "name": "dns2.siteturn.com",

Anderlaw.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",
Atlantarecyclingcenters.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",
Centurythis.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",
foxcabinets.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",
gandmco.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",
Gandmco.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",
Miamirecyclecenters.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",
suncoastot.com       "name": "dns3.name-services.com",

Ideathlike.net       "name": "ns1.texneed.ru",
Sherylbro.net       "name": "ns1.texneed.ru",

dueeffepromotion.com       "name": "ns2.mdsnet.it",
mautau.it       "name": "ns2.mdsnet.it",


brownpa.net     "name": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
hard-grooves.com     "name": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
hellonwheelsthemovie.com     "name": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
qxr33qxr.com     "name": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
qxr33qxr.com     "name": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
Richarddrakeconstruction.com     "name": "Tucows Domains Inc.",



Sorting by Organization. We can see domains clustered with same organization names

faisal@siftworkstation:/home/sansforensics/incidents$ cat whois_output.txt | grep -i "organization" | sort -k2 -k1
Ernestoangiolini.com     "organization": "Ascio Technologies, Inc. Danmark - Filial af Ascio technologies, Inc. USA",
babyemozioni.it     "organization": "Aziende Italia s.r.l.",
Asecontrids.com     "organization": "CCI REG S.A.",
babyemozioni.it       "organization": "Cinzia Cazzaro",
babyemozioni.it       "organization": "Cinzia Cazzaro",
bnphealthcare.com     "organization": "Deluxe Small Business Sales, Inc. d/b/a Aplus.net",
Anderlaw.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
Atlantarecyclingcenters.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
Centurythis.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
dueeffepromotion.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
fianceevisa101.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
Fmarson.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
Formareal.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
foxcabinets.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
gandmco.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
Gandmco.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
Miamirecyclecenters.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
suncoastot.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
uvitacr.com     "organization": "eNom, Inc.",
Fetchstats.net     "organization": "Eranet International Limited",
Fetchstats.net     "organization": "Eranet International Limited",
haddownding.net     "organization": "Eranet International Limited",
Ideathlike.net     "organization": "Eranet International Limited",
Sherylbro.net     "organization": "Eranet International Limited",
arc-conduite.com     "organization": "Gandi SAS",
associationlachaloupe.com     "organization": "Gandi SAS",
autoecoleautonome.com     "organization": "Gandi SAS",
autoecolejeanluc.com     "organization": "Gandi SAS",
cogerea.net     "organization": "Gandi SAS",
baptistown-nj.com     "organization": "GoDaddy.com, LLC",
mastertenniscoach.com     "organization": "GoDaddy.com, LLC",
pentahealthinstitute.com     "organization": "GoDaddy.com, LLC",
prescottinternet.net     "organization": "GoDaddy.com, LLC",
babyemozioni.it       "organization": "Gruppo Barichello srl",
mautau.it       "organization": "Mautau S.r.l.",
mautau.it     "organization": "Mds Net s.r.l.",
mautau.it       "organization": null,
mautau.it       "organization": null,
Consultingfranquean.com     "organization": "OVH",
gaestehaus-im-vogelsang.de       "organization": "Red-Pearl-Media",
gaestehaus-im-vogelsang.de     "organization": "Red-Pearl-Media",
Xploramail.com     "organization": "Soluciones Corporativas IP, SL",
brownpa.net     "organization": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
hard-grooves.com     "organization": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
hellonwheelsthemovie.com     "organization": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
qxr33qxr.com     "organization": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
qxr33qxr.com     "organization": "Tucows Domains Inc.",
Richarddrakeconstruction.com     "organization": "Tucows Domains Inc.",

Now let us see the updated_date for domains  and we can see clustered domain updates.

gaestehaus-im-vogelsang.de       "updated_on": "2010-04-28T18:26:37+02:00"
mautau.it       "updated_on": "2010-05-04 10:38:26 +0000"
mautau.it       "updated_on": "2010-05-04 10:38:49 +0000"
mautau.it       "updated_on": "2010-05-04 10:38:49 +0000"
gaestehaus-im-vogelsang.de   "updated_on": "2011-02-14 18:01:33 +0000",
babyemozioni.it       "updated_on": "2012-02-02 13:45:00 +0000"
prescottinternet.net   "updated_on": "2016-09-22 21:09:34 UTC",
yamanashi-jyujin.jp   "updated_on": "2016-12-01 01:05:09 +0000",
Consultingfranquean.com   "updated_on": "2016-12-29 18:00:48 UTC",
associationlachaloupe.com   "updated_on": "2017-02-09 08:01:40 UTC",
arc-conduite.com   "updated_on": "2017-02-15 10:28:04 UTC",
autoecoleautonome.com   "updated_on": "2017-02-22 15:24:21 UTC",
babyemozioni.it   "updated_on": "2017-02-24 01:01:26 +0000",
qxr33qxr.com   "updated_on": "2017-02-25 09:03:06 UTC",
qxr33qxr.com   "updated_on": "2017-02-25 09:03:06 UTC",
Miamirecyclecenters.com   "updated_on": "2017-03-02 11:05:54 UTC",
Atlantarecyclingcenters.com   "updated_on": "2017-03-02 11:05:55 UTC",
dueeffepromotion.com   "updated_on": "2017-03-03 21:48:08 UTC",
foxcabinets.com   "updated_on": "2017-03-05 06:18:18 UTC",
uvitacr.com   "updated_on": "2017-03-09 05:09:49 UTC",
pentahealthinstitute.com   "updated_on": "2017-03-23 14:26:54 UTC",
brownpa.net   "updated_on": "2017-04-03 18:17:26 UTC",
Formareal.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-03 10:31:05 UTC",
bnphealthcare.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-08 02:59:21 UTC",
hellonwheelsthemovie.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-15 19:59:26 UTC",
gandmco.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-18 07:54:27 UTC",
Gandmco.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-18 07:54:27 UTC",
Richarddrakeconstruction.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-19 15:14:53 UTC",
fianceevisa101.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-22 17:40:48 UTC",
Fmarson.com   "updated_on": "2017-05-23 02:59:40 UTC",
mastertenniscoach.com   "updated_on": "2017-06-04 19:17:30 UTC",
Xploramail.com   "updated_on": "2017-06-15 13:36:45 UTC",
baptistown-nj.com   "updated_on": "2017-06-27 10:53:57 UTC",
autoecolejeanluc.com   "updated_on": "2017-07-11 11:48:45 UTC",
Centurythis.com   "updated_on": "2017-08-11 08:35:41 UTC",
Ernestoangiolini.com   "updated_on": "2017-08-28 07:17:17 UTC",
Asecontrids.com   "updated_on": "2017-08-28 20:17:03 UTC",
cogerea.net   "updated_on": "2017-09-15 09:13:40 UTC",
hard-grooves.com   "updated_on": "2017-09-19 16:43:07 UTC",
Ideathlike.net   "updated_on": "2017-09-25 07:46:07 UTC",
Sherylbro.net   "updated_on": "2017-10-08 03:00:52 UTC",
Fetchstats.net   "updated_on": "2017-10-10 09:53:25 UTC",
Fetchstats.net   "updated_on": "2017-10-10 09:53:25 UTC",
Anderlaw.com   "updated_on": "2017-10-11 15:23:47 UTC",
suncoastot.com   "updated_on": "2017-10-13 23:16:48 UTC",
haddownding.net   "updated_on": "2017-10-19 02:45:30 UTC",
mautau.it   "updated_on": "2017-10-20 11:35:18 +0000",
babyemozioni.it       "updated_on": null
babyemozioni.it       "updated_on": null
animatoon.be   "updated_on": null,
calpadia.co.id   "updated_on": null,
Highlandfamily.org   "updated_on": null,
highpressurewelding.co.uk   "updated_on": null,
Hutterstock.org   "updated_on": null,
Hutterstock.org   "updated_on": null,
naturofind.org   "updated_on": null,
pizzelli.eu   "updated_on": null,
team-bobcat.org   "updated_on": null,


 Some Interesting points

Most of the malicious domains showed following results when they were site searched using Google:


These seem to be ads in Japanese 


Domain: Mautau(dot)it


The above link to a PDF document on the domain mautau(dot)it, redirects to http://wrcchq(dot)org/Bank/Scans385.zip. This compressed file is reported to also contain a malicious script, which downloads Locky.

Ref: https://vorsicht-email.de/beitrag/2017/09/27/ups-ship-notification-tracking-number-1z67082y5658349975-von-ups-quantum-view-pkginfo84ups-com/

Ref: http://www.fortiguard.com/encyclopedia/virus/7521270/w32-kryptik-fxnh-tr


Domain: pizzelli(dot)eu

Domain: anderlaw(dot)com

Domain: dueeffepromotion(dot)com

Again we see that the following link on the dueeffepromotion(dot)com domain, redirects to the same URL http://wrcchq(dot)org/Bank/Scans385.zip


Domain: qxr33qxr(dot)com

Another interesting link on this domain qxr33qxr(dot)com. Most probably a concatenation of  download links for malware:





Some interesting strings, which can be used to create YARA rules to detect the malware

dda37961870ce079defbf185eeeef905 (locky)
lodctr /m
/7\uqSFVW
j2rlN8r
T@_W$0A@@AT
delmodem.exe
tmdmnt.sys
_L0ckW0O0B0



dbc0aa7e70df7e27ae9169ae0962e2cf (trickbot)
accc__o_es_Memory
abkke__2_dll
gcai0oQHed
[#zhmibYKtM




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